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MEDICAL ADVERSE EVENTS AND 
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION IN ARIZONA: By-
the-N umbers 
Ashley M. Votruba * & Michael J. Saks** 
INTRODUCTION 
A new medical malpractice "crisis" periodically erupts across the United 
States, invariably producing calls for legislative solutions. Typically, the 
public is told that rising malpractice insurance premiums are driving doctors 
out of their practices or out of our state, while increasing the cost of health 
care, and that those rising insurance rates are the product of too many 
unwarranted lawsuits resulting in exorbitant damage awards. The legislative 
fixes typically involve restricting the ability of plaintiffs to bring claims, to 
prosecute their claims successfully, or to recover full damages if they 
happen to prevail on their claims. 1 The U.S. Congress sometimes threatens 
to intervene, replacing what traditionally has been an area of state law with 
national rules regulating this one area of tort litigation.2 Even without a new 
cns1s, new legislation might emerge in the near future pursuant to 
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**. Regents' Professor of Law and Psychology; Faculty Fellow, Center for Law, Science 
& Innovation, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University. Ph.D. 1975, 
Ohio State University; M.S.L. 1983, Yale Law School. 
1. See generally FRANK A. SLOAN & LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
(2008); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY (1995); TOM BAKER, 
THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005); MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH 
CARE SYSTEM (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006). Most of the legislation hobbles 
meritorious claims equally with non-meritorious claims. For a recent review of the evidence 
bearing on popular theories of the causes of the periodic medical malpractice crises, see David 
A Hyman & Charles Silver, Five Myths of Medical Ma/practice, 143 CHEST 222 (2013). 
2. One report observes: 
In early 2011, [Congress] focused renewed attention on the topic of medical 
malpractice reform at the national level. Bills to cap noneconomic damages, 
tighten the deadline for filing a medical malpractice claim, limit attorneys' 
fees, and impose other restrictions on medical malpractice lawsuits in state 
and federal courts were introduced in both the House and the Senate. 
Cynthia G. Lee & Robert C. Lafountain, Medical Malpractice Litigation in State Courts, 
COlJRT STATISTICS PROJECT CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS, Apr. 2001, at 1, available at 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/flashmicrosites/csp/images/ch-18-1.pdf. 
First published by Arizona State Law Journal, Volume 45, Issue 4.
Votruba, A. M. & Saks, M. J. (2013). Medical adverse events and malpractice litigation in Arizona: 
By-the-numbers. Arizona State Law Journal, 45(4), 1537–1561.
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provisions of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") that encourage states to 
experiment with medical malpractice reforms by offering to subsidize that 
experimentation.3 Additionally, with more people receiving health care in 
consequence of the ACA, more cases of iatrogenic injury will occur, 
leading to more claims for compensation and more pressure on legislatures. 
Malpractice reform legislation typically is informed by little more than 
anecdotes, assumptions, and intuition.4 But the bedrock of good public 
policy is sound information. 5 The aim of this Article is to provide more 
3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10607, 124 Stat. 
119, 1009-14 (2010). 
4. Past medical malpractice reform legislation in Arizona has been justified by the 
argument that such laws are reasonably related to "the effects on public health of increased 
medical malpractice insurance rates and the reluctance of qualified physicians to practice" in 
Arizona. Seisinger v. Siebel, 203 P.3d 484, 494 (Ariz. 2009). In the light of extensive empirical 
evidence showing iatrogenic injury to be a major public health problem, however, and with little 
evidence that Arizona's rules affect physician migration, legislation that reduces incentives for 
greater safety even further should have difficulty surviving even a rational relationship 
challenge. 
Indeed (and ironically), while some lawmakers have been dialing down the incentives 
for safety, other lawmakers have been ratcheting up the incentives in an effort to reduce the 
incidence of costly and harmful iatrogenic injuries. Medicare has started denying payment to 
hospitals nationwide for treatment of injuries that should never have occurred. See Social 
Security Act (SSA) § 1886(d)(4)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(4)(D) (2012) (originally enacted 
as Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 500l(c)(l), 120 Stat. 4, 30); Medicare 
Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2008 
Rates, 72 Fed. Reg. 47130, 47202 (Aug. 22, 2007); Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital 
Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2009 Rates, 73 Fed. Reg. 48434, 
48471-91 (Aug. 19, 2008) (mandating that the HHS Office of Inspector General investigate and 
identify the class of such events and that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services develop 
processes to deny payment for such injuries); see also DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEl-06-09-00090, ADVERSE EVENTS IN HOSPITALS: NATIONAL 
INCIDENCE AMONG MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES 4-5 (2010), available at 
https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-09-00090.pdf. 
Economic incentives related to patient safety are perverse: hospitals and physicians profit 
from patient injuries (because they are paid first to treat the underlying illness or injury and a 
second time to repair the iatrogenic injury that occurred during treatment), and so by improving 
patient safety they lose revenue. Sunil Eappen et al., Relationship Between Occurrence of 
Surgical Complications and Hospital Finances, 309 JAMA 1599, 1605 (2013); Uwe E. 
Reinhardt, Making Surgical Complications Pay, 309 JAMA 1634 (2013); see also Michelle M. 
Mello et al., Who Pays for Medical Errors? An Analysis of Adverse Event Costs, the Medical 
Liability System, and Incentives for Patient Safety Improvement, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
835, 835 (2007) ("On average, the sampled hospitals generated injury-related costs of $2,013, 
and negligent-injury-related costs of $1,246, per discharge. However, hospitals bore only 22 
percent of these costs."). Thus, as tort law is becoming enfeebled as a means of internalizing 
costs back to the party in the best position to reduce injury risks, alternative means are being 
devised to make continuing failure to improve patient safety unprofitable. 
5. As the Harvard Medical Practice Study ("HMPS") researchers noted, "[G]ovemments 
should know something about the real world of medical injury and malpractice litigation before 
they enact reforms that profoundly affect the fates of patients, doctors, and lawyers for decades 
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complete and more accurate data about the problem of medical error and 
malpractice litigation in Arizona. Such data have not previously been 
available to Arizona lawmakers because empirical studies of the problem 
have not been conducted in Arizona, though they have been in a number of 
other states. 6 
By extrapolating from data collected in other states on this problem, we 
are able to estimate the number of injurious adverse events that occur in 
Arizona hospitals each year (at least 20,000, of which at least 1,300 are 
deaths); the number of those that are the result of what the law would 
consider to be negligent care (at least 5,600); the annual cost of those 
negligently caused injuries to their victims, the victims' insurers, and 
taxpayers (at least $1.6 billion); how many lawsuits arise (about 2 for every 
100 adverse events and 9 for every 100 negligent adverse events); the 
portion of the economic loss suffered by negligently injured patients 
returned by Arizona's civil justice system (at most 3.8%); and other data.7 
Our goal is to assist the Legislature in understanding the problem of 
iatrogenic injury more fully and more accurately. That improved 
understanding might lead to recognition of the most serious dimensions of 
the problem and a reorientation towards creating solutions that will reduce 
the incidence of avoidable injury in the first place, 8 in tum reducing the 
heavy cost burden that Arizonans bear as a consequence of iatrogenic 
injuries, and thereby reducing the need for litigation and its attendant costs. 
to come." PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, 
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 152 (1993). Long before those 
researchers promoted the value of evidence to problem solving, Sherlock Holmes explained: "It 
is a capital mistake to theorise before one has data." Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Adventures of 
Sherlock Holmes-A Scandal in Bohemia, STRAND MAG., July 1891, at 61, 63, available at 
http://www.sshf.com/canon/Strand-Magazine/Strand-Magazine-SCAN.pdf. 
6. For example, the Arizona State Senate research brief on the issue of medical 
malpractice provides no information on the problem of iatrogenic injury. ARIZ. ST. SENATE 
RESEARCH STAFF, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 (2010) (focusing on ways to "limit medical 
malpractice costs," meaning the costs of professional liability insurance, not the costs of 
iatrogenic injuries). 
7. The figures in this paragraph represent the most optimistic scenario one can 
reasonably entertain. As will become clear, infra, the number of adverse events, negligent 
adverse events, and economic losses by victims, insurers, and taxpayers are almost certainly 
higher. 
8. Suggesting what those beneficial legal reforms might be is beyond the scope of this 
Article. Suffice it to say that literature on improving patient safety has been developing, and 
some legal steps are being taken. One place to enter that literature would be: INST. OF MED., To 
ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) 
[hereinafter IOM REPORT]. 
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I. EVOLVING LAW AFFECTING MALPRACTICE LITIGATION 
Three waves of legislation followed the malpractice insurance crises of 
the mid-1970s, the mid-1980s, and early-to-mid-2000s. Each successive 
wave built on the preceding one and together aimed at a range of targets. 9 
Much of the legislation imposed new rules designed to reduce the ability 
of plaintiffs to bring claims (e.g., screening panels, certificates of merit, and 
shortened statutes of limitations) or to prevail on those claims ( e.g., special 
expert witness rules and locality rules). For plaintiffs whose cases are 
successful, additional rules placed limits on the size of recoveries ( e.g., caps 
on general and sometimes also on economic damages, abolition of the 
collateral source rule, and abolition of joint and several liability). 
Some reforms modified the legal process in order to dispose of cases 
more expeditiously and perhaps more inexpensively ( e.g., encouragement of 
early settlement, mediation, and arbitration). Still others focused on 
insurance ( e.g., taxpayer subsidization of malpractice premiums, limits on 
premium increases, risk pooling, and rate compression). Finally, some 
legislation addressed quality of care and patient safety ( e.g., imposing 
hospital accreditation requirements and mandatory error reporting) or 
patients' ability to choose safer hospitals over riskier ones (e.g., mandating 
public access to data on errors, disciplinary actions, and malpractice suits). 
Arizona has passed-and sometimes later repealed-or attempted and 
failed to pass, a number of such reforms. Here, we describe a sampling of 
past and ongoing efforts to change the legal landscape of medical 
malpractice disputes. 
Pretrial Screening. In 1976, in response to an abrupt rise in malpractice 
insurance premiums nationally and in Arizona, the Legislature created a 
mandatory pretrial screening process for malpractice claims known as the 
Medical Liability Review Panel. 10 The purpose of the panel was "to screen 
all malpractice cases with the aim of keeping less meritorious claims from 
9. See FRANK A. SLOAN & LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, ch. 4 (2008); 
AARP, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE POLICY OPTIONS 2-11 
(2005) (describing reforms). 
10. Jona Goldschmidt, Where Have All the Panels Gone? A History of the Arizona 
Medical Liability Review Panel, 23 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1013, 1014 (1991). Prior to the advent of the 
mandatory pretrial screening process, the Joint Screening Panel was in effect. Id. at 1019. This 
panel consisted of twelve to sixteen members including "up to ten members of the Medico-
Legal Committees of the county's medical society and bar association." Id. at 1020. Prior to 
filing a suit, the plaintiffs could voluntarily submit their claim to the Joint Screening Panel, 
which would review the claim and vote on whether there was sufficient evidence of malpractice 
and, if there was, another vote determined whether there was a "reasonable medical probability 
that the claimant was injured." Id. at 1021. Some concern existed that these panels were 
weighted in favor of the defense. Id. at 1022. 
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going to court." 11 Additionally, the panel was intended to expedite the 
settlement of meritorious cases. 12 The legislation that was adopted required 
that upon the filing of a claim for medical malpractice, a panel consisting of 
an attorney, a superior court judge, and a physician (when possible, a 
physician practicing the same specialty as the defendant) review the case. 13 
The panel was directed to decide by majority vote "whether the evidence 
presented to the panel by all parties supports a judgment for the plaintiff or 
for the defendant."14 Plaintiffs were allowed to prosecute their claim no 
matter the outcome of the panel's vote. 15 If the panel found in favor of the 
plaintiff, then the panel and county medical society were directed to 
cooperate fully in helping the plaintiff retain an expert and to consult with 
and testify on behalf of the plaintiff. 16 In 1989, during another wave of 
legislation seeking to tame rising malpractice premiums, concerns surfaced 
that the pretrial screening panels were not operating as intended or 
achieving their goals, 17 and the Legislature repealed the Medical Liability 
Review Panels. 18 
Affidavit of Merit. Legislation passed in 2004 requires plaintiffs to file an 
Affidavit of Merit-a certified written statement-along with the complaint 
stating whether expert opinion testimony will be necessary 19 and, if so, to 
also provide a "preliminary expert opinion affidavit."20 The Legislature 
11. Id. at 1025-26 (citing H. COMM. ON HEALTH, 32D LEG., 1ST SPEC. SESS., MINUTES OF 
MEETING 2 (1976)). 
12. Id. at 1029. 
13. Id. at 1031. 
14. Id. at 1035-36 (citing Medical Malpractice Act, ch. 1, sec. 4, § 12-567(F), 1976 Ariz. 
Sess. Laws (repealed 1989) ). 
15. Id. at 1037. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 1053. These conclusions were based in significant part on a National Center for 
State Courts study in 1980. Id. at 1052. Although the study found that the number of medical 
malpractice case filings had declined and the percentages of settlements had increased since the 
creation of the review panels, it nonetheless raised major concerns. Id. at 1053. First, although 
the panels were intended to reduce the duration of litigation, medical malpractice cases were 
actually taking longer to reach disposition, whether by trial or settlement. Id. The study also 
found that the panels were suffering from administrative problems, including not having panels 
appointed or convened within the specified time limits and having scheduling problems as the 
panels developed into "mini-trials," creating a burden on the panel judges and court staff. Id. 
Another study, based on insurance claims, concluded that the panels were actually creating 
greater litigation costs because more malpractice suits were being initiated with the expectation 
of lower expenses and because disputes were taking longer to resolve. Id. at 1054. In sum, it 
appeared that the panels were failing to achieve their two main objectives: screening out 
unmeritorious cases and expediting settlement. 
18. Id. at 1049-50. 
19. ARiz. REV. STAT.§ 12-2603(A) (2012). 
20. Id. § 12-2603(B). 
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intended to keep non-meritorious suits at bay by essentially requiring the 
suits to be pre-approved as meritorious by an expert.21 
Expert Witness Limitations. Additional legislation creates specific 
requirements for expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases. In 
malpractice litigation, medical experts are generally a necessity for 
providing evidence of the applicable standard of care, among other matters. 
The legislation, adopted in 2005, requires experts offered against or on 
behalf of a defendant to satisfy the following conditions: ( 1) to be a licensed 
health professional; (2) to be of the same board certified specialty as the 
defendant (if the defendant is a board certified specialist); (3) to have spent 
the majority of his or her professional time in the year prior to the alleged 
injury in active clinical practice of the same health profession as the 
defendant, teaching students in an accredited health professional school, or 
some combination of the two; and (4) to have devoted a majority of his or 
her professional time, if the defendant is a general practitioner, in active 
clinical practice as a general practitioner or teaching in an accredited health 
professional school. 22 
Abolition of Joint and Several Liability. When litigation is successful, 
Arizona has made recovery of full damages more difficult. In 1988, Arizona 
abolished joint and several liability in favor of several liability,23 under 
which each defendant is liable only for the amount of damages that 
corresponds to his or her proportion of fault. 24 This is a classic instance of 
creating a more equitable distribution of responsibility among tortfeasors at 
the expense of the innocent victim, a choice that the common law had long 
shunned. It means that to recover full damages, a plaintiff must name all 
potential defendants in a case, even those whose responsibility was small, 
21. "The legislature declares that the purpose of§ 12-2603, Arizona Revised Statutes, is to 
curtail the filing of frivolous lawsuits against health care professionals and the filing of 
frivolous nonparty at fault designations by health care professionals." ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 
12-2603 (2012). 
22. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 12-2604(A) (2012). Where the statute prevents a specialist's 
procedures from being criticized by a less knowledgeable expert, it can serve to prevent juries 
from being misled (and can be said to elevate the requisite qualification). But where a less well-
trained, less up-to-date practitioner is protected from being evaluated by a better-qualified 
specialist, the statute prevents factfinders from becoming informed about more appropriate, 
beneficial, or safer procedures (the opposite of elevating requisite expert qualifications). 1n any 
event, the statute shrinks the pool of experts available to address any given disputed issues to 
those who belong to the smallest cognizable sub-guild, thereby increasing the probability that a 
case will be dismissed before any of its merits can be examined. A more nuanced statute, better 
serving legitimate competing interests, could have been drafted. 
23. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2506 (2012). 
24. Id. 
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adding inefficiency and cost to litigation, 25 while depriving victims of the 
full compensation found by a court to be due them. 
Caps on Awards. The capping of awards is made more difficult in 
Arizona than in other states because the Arizona Constitution prohibits 
legislation limiting recoverable damages for tortious personal injury and 
death. 26 Consequently, some have sought to repeal that provision of the 
Arizona Constitution, thus far unsuccessfully. 27 
Several other changes in Arizona law pertaining to medical professional 
liability are listed in the margin. 28 
II. DEVELOPING A STATISTICAL PICTURE OF IATROGENIC INJURY 
AND LITIGATION IN ARIZONA 
In weighing the costs and benefits of various kinds of malpractice reform 
legislation, and in contemplating how best to deal with the general problem 
of iatrogenic injury and health care costs, it would have been be useful for 
the Legislature to know how many people in Arizona are injured or killed 
by negligent health care, at what cost, and how the civil justice system 
responds to such occurrences. Such data have been developed in some other 
states, but not yet in Arizona. The present Article has drawn from the 
findings of those other studies, and extrapolated them to the annual 
population of Arizona hospital admissions. 
The principal metric used to count instances of harm to patients is known 
as the "adverse event." An adverse event is defined as "an injury that was 
caused by medical management (rather than the underlying disease) and that 
prolonged the hospitalization, produced a disability at the time of discharge, 
or both."29 One might think of an adverse event much as one would think of 
25. Interestingly, this is regardless of whether the defendant could even be named as a 
party in the suit. Id. § 12-2506(B). 
26. ARIZ. CONST. art. II,§ 31 (2012). 
27. H. Con. Res. 2001, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2012). Capping of damages (which is 
unconstitutional in Arizona) places the greatest burden on the most seriously injured patients. 
28. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-542 (2012) (reducing the statute of limitation for filing 
malpractice actions to two years); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-563 (2012) (defining the relevant 
reference community for establishing standard of care as the state of Arizona); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
§ 12-565 (2012) (allowing defendants to offer evidence of payments to plaintiffs for the injuries 
by the plaintiffs insurers); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-566 (2012) (prohibiting complaints from 
containing a specified amount of damages); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-568 (2012) (giving court 
discretion to consider and reduce fees paid to plaintiffs' attorneys); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-569 
(2012) (prohibiting introduction of evidence regarding defendant's professional liability 
insurance). 
29. Troyen A. Brennan, Lucian L. Leape, Nan M: Laird, Liesi Hebert, A. Russell Localio, 
Ann G. Lawthers, Joseph P. Newhouse, Paul C. Weiler & Howard H. Hiatt, Incidence of 
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a car accident causing personal injury: an unintended, preventable, harmful 
result of an otherwise socially desirable activity. 30 
Just as not all car accidents are the result of negligence, neither are all 
medical accidents.31 Thus, while all injurious medical accidents are said to 
be adverse events, only a subset of them are negligent adverse events. Only 
the negligent subset are compensable under our law. 
Because it is easier to count accidents and injuries than to determine 
which of them were caused by negligence, hospitals and researchers are 
more likely to count the former and not the latter. Similarly, state and 
national statistics on other kinds of accidents, such as car crashes, count 
accidents and injuries without going to the additional effort and cost of 
identifying which accidents resulted from negligence. Researchers 
interested in the functioning of the legal system, however, take that extra 
step. Consequently, some of the research we draw on in this Article counts 
only adverse events while other studies count adverse events and then 
Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 370 
(1991). An adverse event is synonymous with iatrogenic injury. Adverse events do not include 
unnecessary procedures that were completed safely. Where unnecessary procedures are 
perfonned knowingly, they move beyond negligence and into the realm of intentional torts and 
criminal fraud, battery, and reckless endangennent. See, e.g., Reed Abelson & Julie Creswell, A 
Hospital Chain's Inquiry Cited Unneeded Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2012, at Al 
(reporting that, HCA, the largest for-profit hospital chain in the country, is confronting evidence 
that "unnecessary--even dangerous-procedures were taking place at some HCA hospitals, 
driving up costs and increasing profits"). But these kinds of banns usually will not be detected 
by monitoring for adverse events. 
30. Of course, many differences exist between a car accident and a medical accident, both 
legal and practical. Among them: auto crashes involve parties with no prior relationship; 
medical accidents involve people who have a contractual relationship and usually have at least 
met each other and sometimes have a longer-term relationship. An auto driver owes a general 
duty of care to any and all whom the driver might injure; a physician owes a duty of care only to 
a patient (a person in a contractual relationship with the physician). The breach of the duty owed 
in auto crashes is left to the jury; in medical malpractice, it almost always is a standard to be 
proven with help from expert witnesses. Thus, a doctor who while driving to work causes an 
accident that injures a person is in a much more vulnerable legal position than the very same 
doctor who causes the very same injury to a patient after he arrives at work (not to mention 
limitations on damages that often apply to the malpractice action but not to the auto case). 
Despite all those differences, we believe auto accidents can serve as a useful point of 
comparison, and we will occasionally provide the reader with data on injurious auto accidents in 
Arizona as well as medical accidents. 
31. Negligence is "conduct which falls below the standard [ of care] established by law for 
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 282 (1965). In the Harvard Medical Practice Study, it was summed up as "care that fell below 
the standard expected of physicians in their community." Brennan et al., supra note 29, at 370. 
For those accidental injuries not caused by negligent acts or omissions, liability in tort should 
not be found. 
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assess whether or not the adverse events were caused by below-standard 
care. 
Although they are not the first or only such studies of adverse events and 
negligently caused medical injuries, the most prominent and oft cited of the 
research has been conducted by teams from Harvard University.32 They 
analyzed hospital records in the state of New York,33 followed by similar 
studies in Utah and Colorado.34 
For a number of reasons, the results of those studies unavoidably 
undercount the number of adverse events suffered by patients in any given 
state. First, the studies look only at hospital medical records, so harmful 
errors that occur outside of hospitals are not captured. 35 Furthermore, 
hospital medical records do not reflect all of the adverse events that occur. 
Studies that have examined incidents through more direct means found 
much higher levels of iatrogenic injury than those relying exclusively on 
medical records. Apparently, most iatrogenic injuries are not recorded, or 
recorded in a disguised fashion in an effort to evade responsibility. One 
study found that 36% of patients admitted to a general medical service of a 
university hospital suffered an adverse event injury ( compared to between 
2.9% and 3.7% in the studies of medical records in New York, Colorado, 
32. The Harvard findings are in approximate agreement with earlier studies of other 
locations by other researchers. Whereas the Harvard studies found approximately 1.1 % of New 
York hospital patients became victims of negligent adverse events (i.e., malpractice), and 0.9% 
of Colorado and Utah patients did, a 1977 study of California hospitals found 0.8%, and a 
federal study in 1973 of several states found 2%. CAL. MED. Ass'N & CAL. HOSP. Ass'N, REPORT 
ON THE MEDICAL INSURANCE FEASIBILITY STUDY (Don H. Mills ed., 1977); Leon s. Pocincki et 
al., The Incidence of Iatrogenic Injuries, in U.S. DEP'T HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, DHEW 
PUB. No. [OS] 73-89, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 50-70 (1973). 
33. WEILER ET AL., supra note 5, at 135-52 (concluding with several reform proposals 
based on authors' findings, one of the most interesting being to replace the tort system with a 
system of "enterprise liability''); Brennan et al., supra note 29, at 370 (abstract; methodology); 
see generally IOM REPORT, supra note 8. 
34. Eric J. Thomas, David M. Studdert, Helen R. Burstin, E. John Orav, Timothy Zeena, 
Elliott J. Williams, K. Mason Howard, Paul C. Weiler & Troyen A. Brennan, Incidence and 
Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 261, 261 
(2000). 
35. Almost as many compensation payments are made for outpatient procedures as for 
inpatient, with two-thirds of those being for patients suffering major injury or death. Tara F. 
Bishop et al., Paid Malpractice Claims for Adverse Events in Inpatient and Outpatient Settings, 
305 JAMA 2427, 2428 (2011). The leading causes of adverse events in hospitals are 
medication-related (38%), procedure-related (28%), and nosocomial infections (18%). David C. 
Classen et al., 'Global Trigger Tool' Shows that Adverse Events in Hospitals May be Ten Times 
Greater than Previously Measured, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS 581, 585 (2011). Adverse events 
outside of hospitals doubtless have a different profile. 
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and Utah).36 Thus, the actual incidence and cost of adverse events to a state 
is likely considerably higher than one would believe based only on the 
Harvard (and earlier) studies. 
To provide a more realistic range of the possible incidents and costs in 
Arizona hospitals, we also employ the findings from a recent study that 
tested several different methods hospitals use to detect and count adverse 
events.37 One of those, the "Global Trigger Tool," works somewhat more 
like a detective seeking out wrongdoing when it might be hidden from 
view: 
The Global Trigger Tool uses specific methods for reviewing 
medical charts. Closed patient charts are reviewed by two or three 
employees-usually nurses and pharmacists, who are trained to 
review the charts in a systematic manner by looking at discharge 
codes, discharge summaries, medications, lab results, operation 
records, nursing notes, physician progress notes, and other notes or 
comments to determine whether there is a "trigger" in the chart. A 
trigger could be a notation indicating, for example, a medication 
stop order, an abnormal lab result, or use of an antidote 
medication. Any notation of a trigger leads to further investigation 
into whether an adverse event occurred and how severe the event 
was. A physician ultimately has to examine and sign off on this 
chart review.38 
36. K. Steel et al., Iatrogenic Illness on a General Medical Service at a University 
Hospital, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 638 (1981). Furthermore, 9% of admitted patients became 
victims of "major" iatrogenic illness. See also Lori Andrews et al., An Alternative Strategy for 
Studying Adverse Events in Medical Care, 349 LANCET 309 (1997). 
37. Classen et al., supra note 35, at 582-83. The three detection methods employed were 
voluntary reporting of sentinel events, the U.S. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality's 
("AHRQ") Patient Safety Indicators, and the Global Trigger Tool. Id. Voluntary reporting alone 
would have led to a conclusion that 0.5% of patients were victims of adverse events. Id. at 584. 
AHRQ indicators alone would have led to a conclusion that 4.4% of patients suffered adverse 
events. Id. 
For the record, we can add the results of a recent study mandated by Congress. Of the 
nearly one million Medicare beneficiaries discharged from hospitals in October 2008, 
approximately 134,000 experienced at least one adverse event during the one-month study 
period-an adverse event rate of 13.5%. Physicians reviewing the hospital medical records 
determined that 44% of those events were preventable. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 4 at i-ii. 
Yet another study by Harvard researchers (of hospitals in North Carolina), using the 
Global Trigger Tool, found an overall adverse event rate of 25.1 %. Christopher Landrigan et al., 
Temporal Trends in Rates of Patient Harm Resulting from Medical Care, 363 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 2124, 2124 {2010). 
38. Classen et al., supra note 35, at 582. 
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The Global Trigger Tool achieves detection levels that approximate 
those of on-scene observers. 39 
In short, the data reported below rely on several different benchmarks for 
estimating Arizona's rates of adverse events and other measures. Our 
method is straightforward. If studies in other states found that 1 % of 
hospital admissions suffered negligent adverse events, we apply that 1 % 
figure to the number of Arizona hospital admissions to estimate the number 
of Arizona hospital admissions that likely become instances of malpractice. 
By using data from other-state studies with lower and higher incidences of 
negligent adverse events, we can specify a range within which the actual 
Arizona figures are most likely to fall. We use a similar method to impute 
other variables being examined. Those projections are integrated with as 
much Arizona-specific data as are available to complete the statistical 
picture for Arizona.40 
Table 1 provides these source values, consisting of proportions of 
hospital admissions that become adverse events; the subset of adverse 
events that are deaths; negligent adverse events; and deaths caused by those 
negligent adverse events.41 The Colorado/Utah values constitute the lowest 
level of detected harm and, in turn, yield the lowest evidence-based 
estimates of Arizona's iatrogenic injury values. The New York study was 
the flagship of the Harvard research, and its data are somewhat higher than 
the Colorado/Utah proportions. At the high end of the range are the 
proportions developed from the Global Trigger Tool research. We do not 
attempt to count out-of-hospital adverse events, and so even our high-end 
estimates are likely to be conservative. Because the Global Trigger study 
39. See, e.g., Steel et al., supra note 36; Andrews et al., supra note 36. 
40. To supplement publicly available data, on February 1, 2013, we wrote to MICA (the 
major malpractice insurer in Arizona) and the Arizona Insurance Department asking for the 
following information: (1) for 2010, 2011, and 2012, total numbers and payment amounts made 
to claimants at several stages of the malpractice claim process: settlements before a court claim 
is filed, settlements after a claim is filed but before a trial verdict, payments made pursuant to a 
trial verdict (that is, not necessarily the judge or jury's trial award, but the post-trial total 
eventually agreed to by the parties); (2) the amounts by major categories of expenditures made 
from the earned premiums collected from physicians and hospitals. MICA replied with limited 
information; the Arizona Insurance Department replied that it had none of the data we 
requested. 
41. All of these values are conservative in that they count patients who were injured rather 
than instances of injury. More instances of injury occur than there are patients who suffer 
iatrogenic injuries because some patients suffer more than one iatrogenic injury. Thus, the 
Global Trigger study found that, "[ o ]verall, adverse events occurred in 33 .2 percent of hospital 
admissions" while there were "49 [adverse] events per 100 admissions." Classen et al., supra 
note 35, at 584. Since the studies take place over a period of one month, they will have involved 
few readmissions, and we need not confront the complication of whether two admissions might 
reflect one person admitted twice rather than two people admitted once each. 
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does not assess negligence, we imputed those values by applying negligence 
rates from the Colorado, Utah, and New York studies.42 
III. IATROGENIC INJURY AND LITIGATION IN ARlzONA 
This section provides the results of the analysis described in the 
preceding section. It presents a statistical description of Arizona's rates of 
medical adverse events, negligent adverse events (i.e., medical malpractice), 
their costs (i.e., the economic loss suffered by victims, families, first-party 
health and disability insurers, and/or taxpayers), and the law's response, as 
well as other data. For all of the Arizona statistics, unless indicated 
otherwise, we report information for 2010. Table 2 summarizes much of the 
data that we describe in the subsections that follow. 
A. Population and Patients 
According to the 2010 census, the population of Arizona was 
6,392,017.43 For every 1,000 population, about 111 are admitted to hospitals 
each year,44 meaning that approximately 709,514 people are admitted to 
Arizona hospitals annually. Total health spending in Arizona in 2009 was 
$35.8 billion.45 
B. Adverse Events and Negligent Injury 
Using the studies of Utah and Colorado as our benchmarks, we would 
expect at least 20,576 patients to suffer adverse events in one year in 
Arizona hospitals.46 Using the New York study as our benchmark, the 
42. We averaged the findings from those studies to obtain a negligence rate for the Global 
Trigger adverse events and a death rate for negligent adverse events to apply to the Global 
Trigger findings. 
43. U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts, CENSUS.GOV, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/04000.htrnl (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). 
44. Arizona: Hospital Admissions per 1,000 Population, 2011, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/adrnissions/?state=AZ (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). 
45. Arizona: Health Care Expenditure by State or Residence (in millions), 2009, HENRY J. 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-health-spending-2/?state=AZ 
(last visited Oct. 7, 2013). These are the most recent data we could find on Arizona's health care 
expenditures. 
46. Thomas et al., supra note 34, at 265. 
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number of adverse events in Arizona would be 26,252.47 And using the 
Global Trigger study, the number of adverse events would be 235,559.48 
In both the Harvard studies and the Global Trigger studies, roughly half 
of the adverse events are considered minor: defined by the Harvard 
researchers as "minimal impairment, recovery [within] one month," and by 
the Global Trigger researchers as "[t]emporary harm to the patient that 
required intervention. "49 The rates of death vary greatly between the studies, 
with 27% of the classifiable adverse events in the New York50 research 
causing death, but only 2% of the Global Trigger51 adverse events resulting 
in death.52 In line with these benchmarks, adverse events in Arizona cause 
no fewer than 1,358 deaths and as many as 5,534 deaths.53 
As noted earlier, just as every car crash is not the result of negligent 
driving, not every medical adverse event is the result of negligent health 
care. 54 Of the medical adverse events that occur, studies have found that 
between 27.5%55 and 32.6%56 are the result of negligence and between 
8.8%57 and 25.4%58 of those who experience a negligent adverse event die. 
47. Brennan et al., supra note 29, at 371. 
48. Classen et al., supra note 35, at 584. 
49. Brennan et al., supra note 29, at 373; Classen et al., supra note 35, at 585. 
50. Brennan et al., supra note 29, at 373. 
51. Classen et al., supra note 35, at 586. 
52. One explanation for this difference might be that in the decades intervening between 
the studies, medical practitioners became better at saving the lives of patients who became 
victims of iatrogenic injuries. If so, many of the deaths will have moved into less harmful 
categories. From a purely economic perspective, however, it is far more costly to treat and 
rehabilitate a seriously injured patient than it is to bury a deceased one. If this explanation is 
correct, then the decline in deaths also marks an increase in costs. A more likely explanation is 
that the Global Trigger Tool detected more non-fatal and less serious injuries, thereby creating a 
larger base of adverse events. Presumably, it is harder to conceal a deceased or seriously injured 
patient than a less serious one. 
53. To put these numbers in some perspective, there were 50,110 car-accident-related 
injuries in Arizona in 2010 and 762 car-accident-related deaths. ARiz. DEP'T OF TRANSP., 
ARlZONA MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH FACTS 2010 vii (2011). These numbers suggest that medical 
accidents are more lethal than auto accidents. However, auto passengers are generally younger 
and healthier, while as a group, hospital patients are older and more frail. The Arizona 
Department of Health Services enumerates other major causes of death: heart diseases: 12,754; 
cancer: 10,423; Alzheimer's disease: 2,314; diabetes: 1,372; suicide: 1,070; motor vehicle: 711; 
homicide: 404. ARiz. DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., AR!ZONA HEALTH STATUS AND VITAL 
STATISTICS 2010 REPORT tbl.2B-6 (2011). 
54. Driving with reasonable care sometimes results in a car accident, and health care 
provided with reasonable care can nevertheless result in an adverse event injury. 
55. Thomas et al., supra note 34, at 265 (this value was estimated based on data from 
Colorado only). 
56. Id. (this value was estimated based on data from Utah only). 
57. Id. 
58. Brennan et al., supra note 29, at 373. 
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By the benchmarks being employed to estimate Arizona cases, the annual 
incidence of negligent adverse events falls between 5,658 and 70,903. 
Deaths from those negligent adverse events number somewhere between 
498 and 4,025.59 
C. Victim Losses 
Since only negligent adverse events are compensable under the law, we 
estimate only those losses. When a patient suffers from a negligent adverse 
event, additional costs are created-additional medical care, rehabilitation, 
lost earnings, and other costs-and those costs fall upon someone: if not on 
the tortfeasors and their third-party insurers, then on victims and their 
families, their first-party insurers, or on taxpayers. What are those costs? 
Extrapolating from calculations by the Harvard Medical Practice Study, 60 
the average loss per average negligent adverse event (in 2010 dollars) is 
$291,423.61 By multiplying this average by the total number of negligent 
adverse events in Arizona (instances of malpractice), we can estimate the 
total annual cost of such injuries in Arizona. Depending on the benchmark 
number of negligent adverse events, this amount falls somewhere between 
$1.649 billion and $20.663 billion.62 
59. Because the Global Trigger study did not attempt to evaluate negligence for its cases, 
estimates of negligence for those cases were imputed by averaging the negligence rates for the 
New York, Colorado, and Utah studies. Negligent adverse event death rates were similarly 
imputed by averaging the findings of the New York, Colorado, and Utah studies. 
60. Calculated on a statewide basis, these costs for New York came to $3. 77 billion ($1.80 
billion for additional medical care and $1.96 billion for lost earnings and household production) 
for 27,177 negligent adverse events (in 1984 dollars). WEILER ET AL., supra note 5, at 95. 
61. This calculation was reached by taking the $3.77 billion finding from the HMPS, 
adjusted for inflation using the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI inflation calculator found at 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm, divided by the number of negligent adverse 
events in the HMPS, leading to a cost estimate of $291,423 per negligent adverse event. Note 
that health care costs inflate more rapidly than other costs. Consequently, to whatever degree 
the expenses resulting from negligent adverse events include medical expenses, our estimate 
understates the actual costs in 2010 compared to two decades earlier. 
62. If this amount seems implausibly large, the reader might wish to make the following 
adjustment. Assume that all of the Global Trigger's additional adverse event cases (compared to 
the Harvard studies) fall into the temporary harm category, and that the losses suffered by those 
patients are so small as to be negligible, so that those 58% of all the Global Trigger adverse 
event cases can be ignored. That would reduce the cases with measurable losses to 29,779 x 
291,423 = $8,678,285,517. Even this quick-and-dirty, extreme way of making cases disappear 
leaves us with a very large sum of losses to worry about. 
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D. Medical Malpractice Litigation 
Although each year in Arizona tens of thousands of hospital patients 
become victims of adverse events, and thousands suffer a negligent adverse 
event, in 2010 only 484 malpractice claims were filed in state courts. 63 At 
most, about 5% of those cases will be resolved by a trial judgment.64 For 
each case resolved by a trial judgment, approximately eight are settled prior 
to the filing of a claim.65 Thus, it can be estimated that in 2010, Arizona's 
malpractice defendants were presented with about 868 claims66 for 
compensation both inside and outside of the formal legal process. 
A small fraction of medical adverse events (whether negligent or non-
negligent) lead to court claims for compensation. Based on the adverse 
event values shown in Table 2, at most 2.4% of adverse events become 
malpractice claims, and possibly as little as 0.2%. In any event, the great 
majority of injured patients take no legal action to recover compensation for 
their injuries. 
The comparable figure for car crash injuries is at least 19%.67 Expressed 
differently, there are 109 auto accident lawsuits filed per 100,000 
population in Arizona compared to eight filings per 100,000 for medical 
accidents.68 In both types of cases, some or many claims are negotiated and 
63. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE Aruz. COURTS, SUPERIOR COURT NARRATIVE SUMMARY 3 
(2011), available at http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/39/201 lDR/SuperiorCourt.pdf. The figure 
for 2011 was 430 and for 2012 it was 457. From 2000 to 2005, annual filings were between 600 
and 700. From 2006 to the present, they have generally fallen between 400 and 500. Statistics, 
ARiz. JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.azcourts.gov/statistics/Home.aspx# (last visited Feb. 11, 
2013). 
In past research, the claiming rate has been found to increase in approximate 
proportion to the level of severity of injury, from a low of 5.7% for minor temporary disability 
to a high of 17% for major permanent partial disability. From there, the claiming rate drops to 
13% for major permanent total disability, 11 % for grave permanent total disability, and 5.8% 
for death. PATRICIA DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
23 (1985) (referencing Table 2.4). A study of patients who considered their care to be harmful 
or seriously unsatisfactory found that 26% took no action at all, 46% merely changed health 
care providers, 25% complained to their doctor directly, and 9% contacted lawyers (although 
none of those resulted in a filed suit). Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their 
Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical Grievances, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 105, 108 tbl.1 
(1990). 
64. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
INSURANCE CLAIMS IN SEVEN STATES, 2000-2004 7 (2007). 
65. See id. at Table 6. Our estimate of eight cases settled before filing for every trial 
verdict is based on results from three states that provided such data: Florida: 12.91 pre-filing 
settlements for each trial verdict; Missouri: 7.74; Texas: 3.35. 
66. The calculation: 484 + (8*48) = 868. 
67. ARiz. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 53; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ARiz. COURTS, supra 
note 63. The ratio for auto crash filings is 6328/33,195 and for medical injuries is 484/24,151. 
68. Lee & Lafountain, supra note 2, at 2. 
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settled without a court case being filed. If we included those cases, the gap 
between malpractice claims and auto crash claims would be even larger, 
since auto injury cases are routinely handled and settled without the 
involvement of courts or even lawyers. 
Many readers will be interested in the portion of the filed claims that 
lack merit. 69 Above, we provided the claiming rate as a proportion of 
adverse events (somewhere between 2.4% and 0.2%), whether the injury 
was caused by negligence or not. How those divide out into meritorious or 
not is most clearly seen through an analysis by the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study ("HMPS"). HMPS researchers correlated the negligent 
adverse events they found in the hospitals' medical records with the opened 
files ("claims") they found in the records of insurers of New York State's 
doctors and hospitals. Of the 30,121 hospital records reviewed, in 29,802 
cases there were no negligent adverse events and no claims. Of the 280 
negligent adverse events in the medical records (that is, claims that in 
principle could have successfully been brought), only eight became claims 
for compensation. Thus, 2.9% of negligent injuries resulted in claims. 70 Put 
the other way around, insurers never heard 97 .1 % of what would have been 
valid claims. From an economic perspective--compensating injuries, 
internalizing costs, and establishing the proper level of deterrence--one 
might wonder what remains of the civil justice system so far as medical 
negligence is concerned. In addition to those eight claims, however, there 
were thirty-nine additional claims in the insurers' files, which were cases 
69. These are sometimes referred to as "frivolous" claims, and a note on such cases might 
be helpful. Most often, a non-meritorious, or "frivolous," claim really means an adverse event 
injury that was not the result of negligence. But determining negligence in the medical context 
might often be one of the most difficult of torts to evaluate. This is evident from the fact that 
medical records reviewers classifying cases for research purposes encountered genuine 
ambiguity and disagreement among themselves as to whether the care leading to an adverse 
event injury was negligent or not. We can put some numbers to that. In the HMPS study of New 
York, for example, of 30,000 patient records reviewed, 39 involved insurance company-opened 
files that the medico-legal researchers judged not to be caused by negligent care. (We say 
"opened files" rather than "claims" because these are files opened for any reason, of which the 
filing of a legal complaint is only one. Some were opened at the behest of a nervous doctor 
rather than a patient who hired a lawyer.) Of those 39 opened files, 12 appeared to have no basis 
(though perhaps the basis had been hidden by the persons whose notes were being reviewed). 
(Thus, the odds of a claim file being opened without any apparent basis was about 4 in 10,000.) 
Of the rest, I 5 to 18 were judged to have suffered adverse events and 7 were thought by at least 
one of two reviewing doctors to be the victims of negligent injury. In short, if most of the cases 
within the study that eventually were judged to lack merit required higher and higher levels of 
review to resolve ambiguity as to whether or not negligence existed, it should not be surprising 
that within the legal system, initial filings also require increasing levels of review, negotiation, 
and occasionally a trial to resolve their ambiguity. WEILER ET AL., supra note 5. 
70. WEILER ET AL., supra note 5, at 70-75. 
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HMPS researchers had judged not to involve negligence. 71 From the 
perspective of insurers, then, for each valid claim leading to an opened file, 
there were about five non-meritorious cases. At the same time it is true that 
for every claim filed (whether meritorious or not), six additional valid 
claims existed that could have been filed but never were. 72 
Based on data from sixty U.S. medical malpractice insurers, it can be 
seen that of all cases that lead to the opening of an insurance company file, 
64% are eventually dropped, withdrawn, or dismissed; 27% result in a 
settlement with a payment to the plaintiff; and only about 8% proceed to 
trial. 73 If 8% of filed suits in Arizona reach trial, that would be about thirty-
nine of the 2010 filings. 
Extrapolating from other studies, about a quarter of medical malpractice 
cases resolved by a trial verdict end in a verdict favoring the plaintiff. 74 In 
Arizona in 2010, that would mean approximately ten verdicts for plaintiffs 
statewide. That rate is about half of the rate at which tort plaintiffs m 
general prevail at trial. 75 
E. Compensation 
Of the cases that were resolved in 2011, 181 resulted in payments to 
Arizona medical malpractice claimants. 76 The total amount of those 
payments was $63,167,750.77 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Aaron E. Carroll et al, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 135, 137-38 (2012). An earlier study by 
the National Center for State Courts of all types of tort cases found that overall 4.8% were 
resolved by trial, while 11.1 % of medical malpractice cases were likely to require a resolution at 
trial, making them more resistant to settlement than any other type of tort. David Rottman, Tort 
Litigation in The State Courts: Evidence from the Trial Court Information Network, 14 Sr. Cr. 
J., Fall 1990, at 9 fig.5. 
74. The percentage is 26.8% in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND 
VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001 4 tbl.5 (2004). The figure is 23% in Lee & Lafountain, 
supra note 2, at 4. 
75. Plaintiffs win in 51.6% of tort cases overall. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CML 
BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 4 tbl.5 (2008). There is reason to believe that 
difference is the product of the jury's predispositions rather than a reflection of the case 
evidence: at least one report of malpractice insurers' evaluations of their own cases found that 
half of those the insurers thought favored the plaintiff were nevertheless decided by juries in 
favor of the defendants. Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Ma/practice Disputes: Imaging the 
Jury's Shadow, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1991, at 80 n.115. 
76. Arizona: Number of Paid Medical Ma/practice Claims, 2011, 
STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?ind=436&cat=8&rgn=4 (last visited Feb. 11, 
2013) (information on file with the author). Note that these payments include all categories of 
dispositions, and can include settlements reached prior to filing a complaint, settlements after a 
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As a portion of losses suffered by victims of negligent adverse events, 
indemnity payments made constitute no more than about 3.8%, and possibly 
as little as a fraction of one percent. 78 
According to studies of national scope, the trend in malpractice claiming, 
instances of compensation being paid, and the total amounts paid, all have 
been heading downward for years. 79 That means that the role of the civil 
justice system in providing compensation for victims of avoidable, 
negligent medical injuries is on its way from tiny to miniscule. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has provided a picture of the statistical landscape of medical 
adverse events in Arizona and the response of the state's civil justice 
complaint has been filed, awards made pursuant to a trial judgment, and settlements reached 
following a trial judgment. 
77. Arizona: Payments on Medical Malpractice Claims, 2011, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?ind=437&cat=8&rgn=4 (last visited Feb. 11, 
2013). The mean payment per claim comes to $348,993. In the most recent year for which data 
were reported, namely 2008, the average indemnity payment in a national study of insurer 
closed claims was $342,670. Carroll et al., supra note 73, at 137. 
Several points might be made about compensation payments. Since cases are resolved 
over a considerable period of time, malpractice insurance coverage is said to have a long "tail." 
Thus, payments made in 2010 will mostly be for adverse events occurring before 2010. And 
injuries occurring in 2010 will mostly be resolved after 2010. Therefore, injuries in 2010 do not 
line up with payments made in 2010. Thus, the 2011 expenditures come closer to reflecting 
payments for the 2010 adverse events than payments made in 2010 would. 
In any event, it is best to view this scene across a period of time. Arizona medical 
malpractice payments in other recent years were: 2007: $104 million; 2008: $86 million; 2009: 
$81 million; 2010: $68 million. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Data Analysis Tool: 
Medical Malpractice Payment Report, NAT'L PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, http://www.npdb-
hipdb.hrsa.gov/analysistool/crosstab/index.jsp?REP=MMPR&noQuery=Y (last visited Oct. 8, 
2013) (generated using the Data Analysis Tool selecting "Arizona" and the various years listed). 
Total amounts paid per year will fluctuate because the number of payments is quite 
small from an actuarial perspective, making prediction difficult. By contrast, insurance products 
such as life insurance, fire insurance, or auto liability insurance involve far more claims paying 
far higher total amounts, but the large number of claims makes actuarial prediction much more 
accurate. Ironically, the difficulty of setting malpractice rates derives from the small number of 
cases. Add to this the fact that only a small fraction of medical malpractice victims seek 
compensation (a number that in theory could legitimately jump up "next year") and it is 
understandable that medical malpractice insurers necessarily take a cautious approach, 
preparing for more, and more severe, claims in the future, even though they have never 
materialized. 
78. Calculated from data in Table 2, infra. 
79. Hyman & Silver, supra note 1, at 222-23 ("[T]he frequency of paid medical 
malpractice claims per physician has been dropping steadily since 1992 and is now less than 
one-half the level it was in 1992 . . . . Payout per physician ... is now 46% below the 1992 
level."). 
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system-a picture not otherwise available. 80 We developed estimates of 
various measures based on findings from studies of hospitals in other states 
that were explicitly aimed at learning about the number and nature of 
adverse events in those places, and we used those findings to impute the 
range of injuries, negligence, losses, and legal system responses in Arizona. 
The central lesson of these findings is that negligent adverse events in 
Arizona are quite large in number and constitute a serious public health 
problem for the state. Even by the most optimistic estimates, Arizonans 
suffer from a large number of medical adverse events, which impose a 
heavy burden of injuries, deaths, and economic cost on victims, their 
families, their insurers, and taxpayers. More complete data can be seen in 
Tables 2 and 3 and accompanying text, but a summary is provided here. 
Of the more than 700,000 people admitted to Arizona hospitals each 
year, over 20,000 (and perhaps as many as 235,000) become victims of 
medical adverse events. Approximately half of those injuries cause more 
than minimal impairment, and over 1,300 (perhaps as many as 5,500) cause 
death. In all, approximately 30% of those adverse events are the result of 
negligent care; for deaths, the proportion caused by negligence is 
considerably larger. 
The economic cost of these injuries to victims, families, first-party 
insurers, and taxpayers comes to at least $1.65 billion, almost certainly 
more than $2.50 billion, and very possibly several times more than the last 
amount. 
Of tens of thousands of adverse events and thousands of negligent 
adverse events, fewer than 500 cases are filed in Arizona annually, and in 
total fewer than 200 (at most 3% of negligently injured patients) receive any 
compensation from a doctor's or hospital's insurer. Some of the 
relationships among the data we have described and discussed are 
summarized in Table 3. 
The principal implication of these data for lawmakers is that legal policy 
might be misdirected at trying to keep the victims of iatrogenic injury from 
recovering compensation for their injuries in order to keep malpractice 
premiums low in an effort to attract more doctors to Arizona. 81 A more 
productive focus of legislative attention would be to think creatively and 
80. If, at some future time, hospitals in Arizona undertake to collect and disclose valid and 
reliable data about such incidents in their institutions, policymakers will be in an even better 
position to assess the problem in Arizona. 
81. Research suggests that malpractice insurance laws have little impact in general on the 
geographic migration of physicians, though for a few subcategories they might. See reviews of 
the research in SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 1, at 68-69; and Hyman & Silver, supra note 1, at 
224-25. 
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constructively about how the law could facilitate a reduction in negligent 
adverse events and preferably all adverse events. 
On its own, the health care industry has had little success in improving 
patient safety. 82 One likely reason for that failure is that the economic 
incentives are backwards: more adverse events earn more revenue for the 
industry. 83 The existing reimbursement structure means that hospitals have 
little incentive to invest in patient safety when those investments will 
inevitably reduce income. 84 The motivation to improve safety will have to 
spring from other sources. 
For centuries, tort law had been the feedback loop that provided 
incentives both economic and psychological for individuals and 
organizations to seek to conduct their activities at the optimal level of 
safety.85 In recent decades, disproportionate legislative attention has been 
82. See, e.g., Landrigan et al., supra note 37, at 2133. 
83. This is not to say anyone harms patients intentionally----other than those physicians 
who knowingly perform unnecessary procedures. See, e.g., Abelson & Creswell, supra note 29. 
84. See supra note 4. 
85. Note that the operative word is "optimal," not maximal. The negligence standard in 
tort law does not aim to stop accidents entirely. It aims to have members of society conduct 
their harm-risking activities more safely only to the extent that the cost of harm avoidance does 
not exceed the cost of the harm ( when it occurs), discounted by the probability of its occurrence. 
That, in the view of classical economic analysis, is what the law achieves by setting the 
threshold for liability at "negligence." See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTIJRE OF TORT LAW 85 (1987); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 
1 (1970). 
Moreover, negligence law might be expected to work especially well in relation to 
industries that, by their nature, cause repeated injury. Provided that the costs of harm fall back 
onto the industry (which is what, in principle, tort litigation accomplishes), those organizations 
are in an excellent position to assess how much it is worth to invest in measures to prevent or 
reduce the seriousness of injuries. A rational organization aims to keep the cost of its product or 
service lower than the competition, and it is in the best position to decide whether that price can 
be made most competitive by compensating its victims or by investing in safety to reduce the 
number of victims. 
But, to the extent that an industry can displace the cost of the harm it causes onto 
others, it has no less incentive to invest in safety, and its price will not reflect the full cost of its 
activities. The costs of doing business that can be shifted to others are referred to as 
externalities. The role of tort law is to internalize those costs back onto the industry that creates 
them. To the extent that the law does not accomplish that, the industry is, in effect, receiving a 
subsidy. 
Consider the position of a hospital where the cost of negligent adverse events is paid 
not by the hospital but by the first-party health insurer of the victim of injury, by the victim's 
employer's disability insurance, by the victim's family, and/or by taxpayers through some form 
of social insurance (including Medicare, Tricare, and Medicaid). At the same time that the 
health care industry is externalizing the costs created by its injurious missteps, the industry is in 
the unique position of profiting from the costs it has created. That occurs when a patient who is 
the victim of a negligent adverse event receives additional health care to remedy the iatrogenic 
injury, paid for, for example, by the patient's health insurer. From this patient's insurer, the 
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paid to malpractice litigation and not nearly enough to medical adverse 
events. A voidable medical errors are one of the leading causes of accidental 
injury and death in Arizona, yet the law invests little, if any, effort in 
improving patient safety and reducing iatrogenic injury. Compare the 
paucity of those efforts to the legal attention given to preventing auto 
accidents. Furthermore, despite their number, medical errors evoke very 
little litigation compared to auto crashes, yet far more legislative attention 
has been given to reducing litigated claims for compensation from medical 
accidents than from auto accidents. 86 
Regardless of what future legislation does to tort law-and perhaps 
especially if tort law continues to be dismantled with regard to medical 
malpractice-something needs to be done to restore or even improve 
sensible economic incentives, or to provide other and more innovative 
assistance, to bring about improvements in patient safety with the aim of 
producing major reductions in the incidence of iatrogenic injuries. By 
attacking the underlying problems and reducing the high number of adverse 
events, the total costs created by those injuries would be reduced, and to 
approximately the same extent the costs externalized to injured patients, 
families, their insurers, and taxpayers would be reduced, the cost of 
malpractice liability insurance would be reduced, and the cost of health care 
would decline. 87 
Discussion of the reforms that might bend the injury curve downward is 
beyond the scope of this Article, though several have been mentioned in 
passing. 88 Imagine if Arizona could accomplish what the Institute of 
Medicine called upon the nation's health care industry to accomplish, but 
industry has received more revenue than it would have had it delivered care to that patient 
safely. 
To the extent that tort law has been disabled by reforms of recent decades from its 
traditional role of internalizing cost to the tortfeasors, whatever incentives had existed to invest 
in safety are reduced. Some government and private health insurers have started to restore or 
instate more rational incentives and motivate greater safety. See, for example, the description, at 
supra note 4, of Medicare's new policy of non-reimbursement for certain iatrogenic injuries, 
forcing the costs to be absorbed by the hospital where the injury occurred, and creating 
incentives to prevent such injuries. 
86. Recall that in Arizona, for every 100,000 population, there are 109 auto accident 
lawsuits filed compared to eight medical malpractice suits. 
87. Or, more precisely, its rise would slow. 
88. One is the elimination of reimbursements to hospitals for iatrogenic injuries that ought 
never to have occurred. If nothing else, future legislation could mandate the use of certain well-
tested methods of counting adverse events and requiring their periodic disclosure. To mention 
one more at the innovative extreme, the conventional medical malpractice tort system could be 
replaced with an enterprise liability system that might lead to dramatic improvements in quality 
of care and patient safety, though its primary target is malpractice reform. Or it might not. 
Experimentation is needed. See generally supra note 4. 
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which it has made little or no progress in achieving: cutting the number of 
adverse events in half within a decade. 89 That Arizona health care 
institutions could be national leaders in patient safety is not beyond reach. 90 
Were Arizona to become a leader in promoting real, practical, constructive 
improvements, copied by other states around the nation, it would not be the 
first time Arizona led in such a fashion. 91 
89. The health care industry in general has made very little detectable progress in that 
direction. See Landrigan et al., supra note 37, and studies cited therein. 
90. One already is: the Mayo Clinic in Arizona was ranked #1 in the most recent 
Consumer Reports safety ratings of 2,031 hospitals throughout the United States. U.S. Hospitals 
Still Not Safe Enough, CONSUMER REP., May 2013, at 11. 
91. Arizona has been a national leader in reforming jury trial processes. See ARIZ. 
SUPREME CT. COMM'N ON THE MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF JURIES, THE POWER OF TWELVE 33-132 
(1994). Thirteen of the Commission's recommendations were adopted as Arizona Rules of 
Procedure, and have since been copied by other states. 
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Table 1. External Source Data Used to Impute Arizona Adverse Event 
Values 
As Proportion of Admissions 
Adverse events 
Adverse event deaths 
Negligent adverse events 
Negligent adverse event 
deaths 
Harvard Med Practice 
Studies 
Global 
Colorado/Utah New York Trigger 
.0290 .0370 .3320 
.0019 .0050 .0078 
.0080 .0121 .0913 
.0007 .0031 .0027 
Note: See text and footnotes for sources of data and methods of calculation. 
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Table 2. Statistical Landscape of Adverse Events and Malpractice 
Litigation in Arizona 
Estimated from Studies in Other 
Admissions 
Total Adverse Events 
Deaths 
Negligent Adverse Events (NAE) 
Deaths 
Economic losses by victims of 
NAEs ($ billions) 
Total Filings 
Settled, dropped, dismissed 
Trials 
Verdicts for plaintiffs 
Settlements and A wards 
Total number of payments 
Total amount($ millions) 
Mean per payment ($) 
Professional Liability Insurance 











Harvard Med Practice 
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Table 3. Several Ratios Among Arizona Medical 
Malpractice Data 
Chance that an Arizona hospital patient will 
become the victim of one or more adverse 
events 
Chance that the victim of an adverse event in 
Arizona will die 
Chance that an adverse event in Arizona is 
the result of negligence 
Chance that the victim of a negligent adverse 
event in Arizona will die 
Ratio of victims of negligent adverse events 
to victims of negligent adverse events who 
file legal claims for compensation in Arizona 
Minimum 
3 in 100 
2.3 in 100 
27 in 100 




33 in 100 
14 in 100 
33 in 100 
25 in 100 
12:1 
Chance that a hospital patient in Arizona will 
file a medical malpractice lawsuit 1 in 1700 
Chance that a victim of a negligent adverse 
events in Arizona will receive compensation92 
Ratio of victims' total economic losses to total 
compensation paid in Arizona 
Note: The tabled values are calculated from data in Table 2. 
0.5 in 100 6 in 100 
327:1 26:1 
92. These values assume that 181 paid claims include payments on all claims whether 
filed in court or presented to insurers prior to and without ever filing a complaint in court, and 
they are calculated on only half of the negligent adverse events in Table 2 on the assumption 
that "minor" injuries (temporary injuries lasting no longer than one month) would not become 
claims at all. 
